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1  Introduction
In Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co1 (“Piliso”) the South African 
Labour Court ordered an employer to pay damages to an employee who had 
been sexually harassed by an unknown person. The victim found crude notes 
on a photograph of herself affixed to her workstation on two consecutive days. 
She notified the employer only after the second occasion. The employer did 
not take action and as a result the employee suffered psychological harm. She 
claimed damages from the employer, but could not prove that the harasser 
was a co-employee (since non-employees also had access to the workplace). 
The Labour Court thus found that she could rely neither on common law 
vicarious liability, nor on section 60 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
(“the EEA”), which under certain circumstances holds the employer liable 
for the acts of its employees. The court did not contemplate the possibility 
that the employer could be held directly liable for discrimination in terms 
of section 6(1) of the EEA. The Labour Court held that in the absence of 
common law and statutory remedies, it was justified in awarding damages 
to the employee based on the violation of the employee’s constitutional right 
to fair labour practices.2 The court found that the legal convictions of the 
community required the employer to do the following after an employee had 
been traumatized in this way:
start a process of investigation to find the perpetrator;• 
provide the employee with support in the form of counselling to minimize • 
the psychological trauma and communicate regularly with the employee on 
her needs; and
take all reasonable steps to eliminate or reduce the possibility of the incident • 
recurring.3
1 (2007) 28 ILJ 897 (LC)
2 The court relied on Conradie JA’s statements in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 617 
(SCA) 618A:
   “Constitutional damages … might be awarded as appropriate relief where no statutory remedies have 
been given or no common law remedies exist  Where the lawgiver has legislated statutory mechanisms 
for securing constitutional rights, and provided of course that they are constitutionally unobjectionable, 
they must be used ”
3 Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (2007) 28 ILJ 897 (LC) paras 78-80
       
The court found that the employer had failed to meet these requirements 
and as a result the employee’s right to fair labour practices had been violated. 
The court accordingly granted constitutional damages.
In contrast to the above decision, the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the Constitutional Court have recently held in a number of decisions that 
litigants may not rely directly on a constitutional right where that right is 
embodied in other legislation.4 According to the Constitutional Court, where 
such legislation does not provide a remedy the correct procedure would be to 
challenge the legislation as falling short of the constitutional standard.5 A 
litigant may thus only bypass enabling legislation if the litigant simultaneously 
demonstrates that the applicable legislation is unconstitutional or inadequate. 
The reason for this requirement is that, in the absence of a constitutional 
challenge to the provisions of enabling legislation, the result would be the 
creation of two parallel systems of law.6
The decision in Piliso and the criticism against the basis for the decision 
raise the question whether there were any other remedies available to Ms 
Piliso. The Labour Court did state in this case that an employer has a common 
law duty to provide a safe working place and that the employer could be held 
liable if the employer’s negligence in failing to prevent sexual harassment 
caused psychological harm.7 However, the court did not investigate these 
grounds any further. Although it certainly is possible that an employee in 
the circumstances of Ms Piliso could have relied on a common law remedy 
based on contract or delict, the focus in this article will be on investigating 
the possibility of holding the employer liable for discrimination in terms of 
section 6 of the EEA.8
Another possibility (not mentioned by the court) is that Ms Piliso could 
have relied on the Compensation for Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 
(“COIDA”). However, in Ntsabo v Real Security CC9 the Labour Court 
regarded a claim based on COIDA as inappropriate in the circumstances of 
sexual harassment because, in the court’s opinion, this type of behaviour 
fell outside the course and scope of employment.10 It is also doubtful 
4 Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign & another as amici curiae) 
2006 8 BCLR 872 (CC) para 97; NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 2 SA 112 (C) 123; 
SANDU v Minister of Defence 2007 8 BCLR 863(CC) para 51
5 SANDU v Minister of Defence 2007 8 BCLR 863(CC) para 51
6 Ngcukaitobi “Direct Allocation of the Constitution in the Labour Court: A Note on Piliso v Old Mutual 
(2007) 28 ILJ 897 (LC)” 2007 (28) ILJ 2178 2179  
7 The court referred to Media 24 Ltd v Grobler 2005 6 SA 328 (SCA) in which the employer was held 
directly liable in terms of the common law for failure to act on a complaint of sexual harassment
8 Ms Piliso could possibly also have relied on the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (“PEPUDA”), which provides that neither the state nor any person may 
discriminate against any person (s 6) and that no person may subject any person to harassment (s 14)  S 
5(3) of PEPUDA provides that it is not applicable to any person to whom and to the extent to which the 
EEA applies  Should the argument be that the EEA is not applicable due to the fact that it could not be 
proved that the harasser is an employee, PEPUDA could be applicable  However, this course of action 
is not more advantageous than instituting proceedings in terms of s 6 of the EEA against Ms Piliso’s 
employer for directly discriminating against her, as she would also have to prove under PEPUDA that the 
employer unfairly discriminated against her or that the employer subjected her to sexual harassment by 
not attending to her complaint  
9 (2003) 24 ILJ 2341 (LC)
10 2380
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whether sexual harassment could be regarded as an “accident” as defined in 
COIDA.11
There is no South African precedent for a remedy based on discrimination by 
the employer in the particular circumstances (harassment by a non-employee), 
but in light of the development of employer liability for discrimination in other 
jurisdictions, this possibility warrants further investigation. A South African 
case of racial harassment in which the employer was held to have discriminated 
against the employee for failing to act against the culprit employee12 further 
adds to the possibility of direct employer liability for discrimination in Piliso 
and similar cases.
In this article, the liability of employers for third party (or non-employee) 
discrimination against its employees in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Australia will be investigated. First, the development of harassment as a 
form of discrimination in each of the mentioned jurisdictions will be discussed 
briefly. The focus will then shift to the development of employer liability for 
the harassment of an employee by a co-employee and finally, the development 
of the liability of employers for the harassment of their employees by third 
persons will be discussed.
2  The United States
2 1  harassment as a form of discrimination
Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 prohibits an employer 
from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” Guidelines of the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)13 specify that sexual 
harassment is a form of discrimination based on sex and thus prohibited in 
terms of Title VII. According to these guidelines:
“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours, and other verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly 
or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, 
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.”14
The United States’ courts have followed these guidelines and interpreted 
the prohibition in Title VII to include harassment15 (since harassment can 
alter the terms and conditions of employment) which is based on one of the 
prohibited grounds.
11 “Accident” is defined in s 1 of COIDA as “an accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s 
employment and resulting in a personal injury ” See Grobler v Naspers (2004) 25 ILJ 439 (C) 514A
12 SATAWU for and on behalf of Finca v Old Mutual Life Insurance Company (SA) Limited and Burger 
[2006] 8 BLLR 737 (LC)
13 Guidelines on Discrimination because of Sex (2005) 29 CFR Ch XIV §1640 11  
14 §1640 11(a)
15 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson 477 U S  57 (1986)
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At first only quid pro quo sexual harassment (referred to as “tangible 
employment action” after the Ellerth16 and Farragher judgements17) was 
recognized by the courts as discrimination.18 Tangible employment action is 
action that results in “a significant change in employment status.”19 Sexual 
harassment which creates a hostile work environment was only subsequently 
recognized as discrimination in cases such as Henson v City of Dundee.20 
In Meritor Savings Bank FSB v Vinson21 the United States Supreme Court 
confirmed that acts creating a hostile working environment will be regarded 
as discrimination if the harassment is so pervasive that it alters conditions of 
employment and creates an abusive working environment.22
2 2  employer liability for harassment of an employee by a co-
employee
In circumstances of sexual harassment by a supervisor where tangible 
employment action was taken, the courts will hold the employer vicariously 
liable without recourse to an affirmative defence; thus the employer will be 
strictly liable.23 Where the supervisor did not take tangible employment action, 
but merely created a hostile environment, the employer may be exonerated if 
he can prove that he exercised reasonable care to prevent or promptly correct 
any sexually harassing behaviour and that the employee unreasonably failed 
to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided by 
the employer.24
In terms of the EEOC guidelines, an employer would be liable for harassment 
of an employee by a co-employee who is not a supervisor if the employer 
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and 
effective remedial action.25
While the employer’s liability for harassment of his employee by a 
supervisor is seen as a type of vicarious liability,26 liability for harassment of 
16 Burlington Industries, Inc. v Ellerth 118 S  Ct  2257 (1998)
17 Faragher v City of Boca Raton 118 S  Ct  2275 (1998)
18 Williams v Saxbe 413 F  Supp 654 (1976)
19 Burlington Industries, Inc. v Ellerth 118 S  Ct  2257 (1998) 2268
20 682 F 2d 897 29 EPD (11th Cir 1982)  The court stated that a hostile work environment is
   “every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial 
equality  Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the 
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the 
harshest of epithets” (902)
 In Harris v Forklift Systems Inc 510 U S  17 (1993) 370-371, the court eased the burden of proof on the 
harassed employee by stating that “so long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is 
perceived as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious”
21 477 U S  57 (1986)
22 67
23 Burlington Industries, Inc. v Ellerth 118 S  Ct  2257 (1998) para 4; Faragher v City of Boca Raton 118 S  
Ct  2275 (1998) para 9
24 Fujiwara & Brown “Cause of Action for Post-Ellerth/Faragher Title VII Employment Sexual Harassment 
Claims” 2005 27 COA 2d 1
25 Guidelines on Discrimination because of Sex §1640 11  
26 In Kohler v Inter-Tel Technologies 244 F 3d 1167 (9th Circuit 2001) the court explained that the US 
Supreme Court referred to this kind of liability as vicarious liability and that the Californian courts 
refer to it as strict liability  The affirmative defence formulated by the Supreme Court in Burlington 
Industries v Ellerth 118 S  Ct  2257 (1998) would be applicable to Californian cases despite the difference 
in terminology  
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his employee by a co-employee is regarded as liability based on the negligent 
failure to act in circumstances in which the employee was harassed.27
Actions of the employer such as suspending the harasser after learning 
about the harassment, changing work schedules and transferring the victim 
after she requested a transfer have been regarded by the courts as prompt 
remedial action and as constituting effective defences against liability.28 In a 
case in which the harassed person could not identify her harassers, the court 
held that the employer could have distributed an anti-harassment policy among 
its employees to ensure that this type of conduct did not occur again. The 
employer was held liable on the basis that it failed to take this step.29 If the 
employee does not report the incident and there is no reason why the employer 
should have known of the harassment, the employer cannot be held liable. 30 
From this it is clear that an employer in the United States cannot be held liable 
for a first incident of sexual harassment by a co-employee in circumstances 
where there were no warning signs that such an action could take place.31
In Lowry v Powerscreen32 the facts were very similar to those in Piliso in 
that graffiti was directed at an employee by an unknown person. However, in 
contrast to Piliso, the employer in Lowry promptly distributed the firm’s existing 
sexual harassment policy and interviewed shift workers to try and establish who 
was responsible for the graffiti. These actions were regarded by the court as 
prompt and remedial corrective action and the employer escaped liability.33
2 3  employer liability for harassment of an employee by a non-
employee
The EEOC issued the following guidelines on harassment of employees by 
non-employees:
“An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment 
of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or 
should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”34
Although the same standard is applicable in the case of harassment 
by co-employees, the guidelines of the EEOC provide that it will take the 
extent of the employer’s control over non-employees and any other legal 
responsibility of the employer into consideration in deciding on the liability 
of the employer.35
27 Fred Meyer, Inc. v Bureau of Labor and Industries 152 Or  App  302, 954 P 2d 804 (1998)  
28 Kent v Henderson 77 F  Supp  2d 628, 81 Fair Empl  Prac  Cas  (BNA) 1373 (E D  Pa  1999)
29 Continental Can Co., Inc. v State 297 N W  2d 241, 22 Fair Empl  Prac  Cas  (BNA) 1808, 23 Empl  Prac  
Dec  (CCH) par 30997 312 (Minn  1980), (94 ALR 5th)
30 Schemensky v California Pizza Kitchen, Inc. 122 F  Supp  2d 7651 (E D  Mich  2000)  
31 Johns v Harborage 1, Ltd  585 N W  2D 853, 78 Fair Empl  Prac  Cas  (BNA) 770, 76 Empl  Prac  Dec  
(CCH) 46145 (Minn  Ct  App  1998)  If the employer had knowledge that a male worker previously 
harassed female co-employees, it may be argued that the employer should have anticipated that other 
employees could be harassed and thus “should have known” of the conduct  
32 72 F  Supp  2d 1061, 81 Fair Empl  Prac  Cas  (BNA) 579 (E D  Mo  1999)
33 1072-1073
34 Guidelines on Discrimination because of Sex §1640 11(e)
35 Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (1999) 
http://www eeoc gov/policy/docs/harassment html (accessed 31-01-2009)
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In Folkerson v Circus Circus Enterprises Inc.36 an employer successfully 
defended a claim of harassment of his employee by a non-employee on the 
basis that he took prompt and remedial corrective action once he learnt of 
the harassment. The employee, a performer in a circus, was touched on the 
shoulder by a member of the audience. The employer promptly removed the 
employee from the show after having learnt of the incident.
The employer in Lockard v Pizza Hut37 was held liable for not responding 
after a waitress complained of being sexually harassed by male customers. 
The manager denied her request to assign the table to another waitress. The 
court stated that
“[a]n employer who condones or tolerates the creation of such an environment should be held liable 
regardless of whether the environment was created by a co-employee or a non-employee, since the 
employer ultimately controls the conditions of the work environment”38
In Windermere v Little39 an employee was raped by a client whose account 
was regarded as very important to the employer. The rape took place outside 
the work premises just after a business meeting with the harasser. When the 
employee reported the rape to a senior person at work, she was informed that 
reporting the rape would probably result in an adverse employment action 
(because of the importance of the client) and was told to go for therapy. 
She eventually reported the incident to the president of the company, but he 
responded that he did not want to hear about the incident and referred her to 
the company’s lawyers. Shortly after reporting the incident she was demoted.
The court held that the conduct (the rape) was sufficiently severe to make 
a reasonable woman feel that her work environment had been altered, even 
though it was only a single incident. Although she had no further contact 
with the rapist, “Windermere’s subsequent actions reinforced rather than 
remediated the harassment”40 and “Windermere’s failure to take immediate 
and effective corrective action allowed the effects of the rape to permeate 
Little’s work environment and alter it irrevocably”.41 Although the employer 
had no control over the harasser, the employer could have ensured that the 
victim had no further duties in regard to this client.
The position in the United States is thus that an employer will be held liable 
for third party or non-employee harassment on the basis of negligence if the 
employer knew or should have known that harassment took place and did not 
take prompt and remedial action. Even in the case of only one incident over 
which the employer did not have control (initially) and there was no warning 
that it would take place, the employer would be liable if he remained passive 
after the incident. The basis for liability is that by its inaction the employer 
reinforced the hostile work environment.
36 107 F 3d 754 (9th Cir  1997)
37 162 F 3d 1062 (10th Cir  1998)
38 1073
39 No  99-35668 (9th Cir  January 23, 2002)
40 1035
41 1036
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2 4  assumption of risk
In 1993, several waitresses who worked at the Hooters restaurant chain sued 
their employers for sexual harassment by customers. Their argument was that 
the sexually provocative uniforms that they were required to wear and the 
atmosphere deliberately created at the restaurants were conducive to sexual 
harassment. However, it has been argued that assumption of risk should be 
a defence available to the employer in these circumstances. The reasonable 
expectations of employees contracting to work at such establishments should, 
according to this argument, be used as a yardstick to determine whether 
harassing conduct is sufficiently serious to “cross the threshold into actionable 
sexual harassment.”42 The Hooters cases were settled out of court and 
therefore do not shed light on the limits of employer liability when it comes to 
the conduct of customers in the workplace.43
An employer who required a receptionist to wear a provocative red, white 
and blue bicentennial costume was held liable when she was harassed by 
clients and the employer insisted that she should keep wearing the costume.44 
In this instance there was no question of assumption of risk (in contrast to 
the Hooters cases), as the nature of the job of receptionist did not imply that 
sexually provocative clothing would be required.
3  The United Kingdom
3 1  harassment as a form of discrimination
Sexual and racial harassment claims in the United Kingdom may be brought 
in terms of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (“the SDA”) or the Race Relations 
Act 1976 (“the RRA”).45
In section 1(1)(a) of both the SDA and the RRA, discrimination is defined as 
“less favourable treatment” on the grounds of sex or race. To bring a successful 
claim based on sexual harassment, the claimant must prove that the employer 
discriminated against her,46 in other words that she was treated less favourably 
and that she suffered a detriment as a result. In British Telecommunications 
PLC v Williams47 the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) defined sexual 
harassment as “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct based 
on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work.”48
In Porcelli v Strathclyde Regional Council49 the court held that if conduct 
is gender-specific, for example a man would not be vulnerable to the conduct 
or verbal abuse, the requirement of section 1 of the SDA in regard to less 
42 Cahill “Hooters: Should there be an Assumption of Risk Defence to Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment Claims?” 1995 (48) Vanderbilt Law Review 1107 1151  
43 Kelly & Watt “Damages in Sex Harassment Cases: A Comparative Study of American, Canadian and 
British Law” 1996 (16) NYLSJICL 79
44 EEOC v Sage Realty Corp  507 F  Supp  599 607 (S N D Y  1981)
45 Harassment was only expressly prohibited by the RRA in 2003  Before the amendments, employees 
harassed on the basis of race could only bring a claim based on direct discrimination
46 S 1 read with s 6 of the SDA
47 [1997] IRLR 668 (EAT)
48 Para 8
49 1986 ICR 564
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favourable treatment has been met and no further proof of such treatment is 
required. In British Telecommunications PLC v Williams,50 the EAT accepted 
this interpretation and stated as follows:
“Because the conduct which constitutes sexual harassment is itself gender-specific, there is no 
necessity to look for a male comparator. Indeed, it would be no defence to a complaint of sexual 
harassment that a person of the other sex would have been similarly so treated.”51
Unfortunately, this interpretation was later overruled by the House of 
Lords,52 as will be discussed below.
3 2  employer liability for harassment of an employee by a co-
employee
Section 32 of the RRA and section 41 of the SDA impose a type of vicarious 
liability on the employer for “[a]nything done by a person in the course of his 
employment … whether or not it was done with the employer’s knowledge or 
approval”. The employer may be exonerated if he proves that he “took such 
steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing that 
act, or from doing in the course of his employment acts of that description”.53 
In Canniffe v East Riding of Yorkshire54 the EAT stated that the following 
questions should be asked in determining whether “reasonably practicable” 
steps have been taken:
(i)  did the respondent take any steps to prevent the employee from doing the 
act or acts complained of in the course of his employment; and
(ii)  were there any steps which could reasonably have been taken which the 
respondent did not take?55
According to the EAT, the answer to the second question must be in the 
negative for an effective defence in the case where there was knowledge of 
the possibility of sexual harassment. Where there was no such suspicion or 
possibility, a sexual harassment policy would be adequate and there would be 
no need to proceed to the second question.56
50 [1997] IRLR 668 (EAT)
51 Para 8  See Garbers “Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: Different Approaches, Persistent 
Problems” 2002 SA Merc LJ 371 386-390 for a discussion of the difficulties experienced by British 
tribunals due to a preoccupation with harassment as discrimination and the concomitant need for a 
comparator  
52 In Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School [2003] UKHL 34
53 Initially the phrase “in the course of his employment” was interpreted in line with the common law 
requirements for vicarious liability  Thus, in Irving v The Post Office [1987] IRLR 289, the Court of 
Appeal held that the Post Office was not liable for racist remarks written on a letter by a Post Office 
employee, as such remarks were regarded as outside the sphere of his employment  However, in Jones v 
Tower Boot [1997] 2 All ER 406 the Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation of the RRA and adopted 
a purposive approach  This debate is now laid to rest with the decision of the House of Lords in Lister v 
Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215, where the “close connection” test based on policy considerations was 
applied, in terms of which intentional wrongdoing was no longer seen as conduct that could never fall 
within the meaning of “in the course of employment”  
54 [2000] IRLR 555
55 Para 14
56 Para 14
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3 3  employer liability for harassment of an employee by a non-employee
In 1997 the EAT held an employer liable for race discrimination where his 
employees were harassed by non-employees. In Burton and Rhule v De Vere 
Hotels57 (“Burton”), two black waitresses were subjected to racial and sexual 
harassment by Bernard Manning, a famous “blue” comedian, and an all-male 
audience. The employment tribunal in this case held that the employer was 
not liable on the discrimination charge because, although the complainants 
suffered a detriment, it was not the employer who subjected them to the 
detriment. The EAT overruled the decision of the tribunal and stated that
“[a]n employer subjects an employee to the detriment of racial harassment if he causes or permits the 
racial harassment to occur in circumstances in which he can control whether it happens or not”;58
and
“where the treatment to which the employer had permitted the employees to be subject was race 
specific, there was no need for the claimants to prove that the employers treated them less favourably 
than they did or would treat employees of a different racial group”.59
For this second part of the judgment, the EAT relied on the dictum in 
Porcelli v Strathclyde60 discussed above
The EAT held that it was not necessary to establish any foresight on the 
side of the employer and held that it was undesirable to import concepts of 
negligence into the statutory torts of racial and sexual discrimination.61 The 
EAT gave the following guidance to employment tribunals:
“The tribunal should ask themselves whether the event in question was something which was 
sufficiently under the control of the employer so that he could, by the application of good employment 
practice, have prevented the harassment or reduced the extent of it. If such is their finding, then the 
employer has subjected the employee to the harassment.”62
Thus, instead of focusing on the negligence of the employer in order to 
establish liability as in the United States,63 the court in the Burton decision 
(and courts that have followed this decision) focused on the measure of control 
that the employer had over the work environment.64 Measures to control the 
57 [1997] ICR 1
58 10
59 10
60 1986 ICR 564
61 Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels [1997] ICR 1 10
62 10
63 As explained above, in the USA the measure of control that an employer is able to exercise will be a factor 
in determining whether the employer was negligent or not
64 In certain circumstances it may be foreseeable that an employee will be harassed by third persons, but 
the employer will not have control over the situation (the example of bus drivers who may be harassed 
by passengers was cited by the court in Burton as an example) and will not be liable if harassment takes 
place  The judgment in Burton was followed in Go Kidz Go Ltd. v Bourdouane EAT case 110/95 (Sept 
10, 1996)  In this case the employee worked for an employer who organised birthday parties for children  
The employee was harassed by the father of one of the children attending a party  After complaining to 
her manager, she was encouraged to return to the party room, where the harassment then continued  The 
tribunal held that although the first incident of harassment was unexpected, the employer could have sent 
someone else to the party after the employee complained  As the employer had control over the situation, 
he was held liable for subjecting the employee to sexual harassment  The employer was thus not liable 
for the first act of harassment, but for the subsequent acts, as he knew about it and had control over the 
situation, but nevertheless omitted to prevent further acts of harassment  The liability incurred by the 
employer in these circumstances is direct liability
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environment may include barring a customer from the premises or removing 
the harassed employee from the location.65 Control by the employer is the 
key element. By controlling the situation or by removing the employee or the 
customer, the employer will have an effective defence.
The House of Lords overruled the Burton judgment in Pearce v Governing 
Body of Mayfield School66 (“Pearce”). According to the House of Lords, 
discrimination by the comedian and the guests in Burton could not be regarded 
as discrimination by the employer in circumstances where the employer 
merely failed to protect the waitresses against the discriminatory conduct. 
Lord Nicholls held that the employer would only be liable for discrimination 
if he had treated white waitresses differently to black waitresses in the same 
circumstances. In other words, to be successful the harassed employees would 
be required to prove that the employer did not take any measures to protect 
them against the discrimination by the comedian and the audience because 
they were black. This burden of proof creates an almost insurmountable 
barrier to complainants.
In Pearce the House of Lords held that there was no discrimination by an 
employer who failed to protect a teacher who was harassed by pupils on the 
basis of her sexual orientation. The court’s reason for the decision was that it 
was likely that a male homosexual would have been similarly treated by the 
employer. The comparator test required by the court has the effect that an 
employer cannot be found guilty in terms of anti-discrimination legislation 
if the employer fails to protect the employee against discrimination and 
there is no proof that he would have protected someone of a different sex or 
race. This legalistic interpretation of the SDA made it extremely difficult for 
employees to proceed against their employers in the case of harassment by 
non-employees.
Since the decision in Pearce, the liability of employers for the harassment 
of their employees by third parties has been addressed in Equal Opportunities 
Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.67 In this case the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC) argued that the Employment Equality (Sex 
Discrimination) Regulations (2005) which were formulated to implement the 
European Equal Treatment Amendment Directive68 in the United Kingdom, 
did not contain the protection provided for in the Directive.
At issue before the court was the 2005 amendment of section 4A(1)(a) of the 
SDA. The section as amended provided as follows:
“For the purposes of this Act, a person subjects a woman to harassment if–
(a)  on the ground of her sex, he engages in unwanted conduct that has the purpose or effect-
  (i)  of violating her dignity, or
  (ii)  of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for 
her
(b)  he engages in any form of unwanted, verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature 
that has the purpose or effect-
65 Go Kidz Go Ltd. v Bourdouane EAT case 110/95 (Sept 10, 1996)  
66 [2003] UKHL 34
67 [2007] EWHC 483 (Admin), [2007] IRLR 327
68 2002/73/EC
416 STELL LR 2009 3
       
  (i)  of violating her dignity, or
  (ii)  of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for 
her.”
The phrase “on the ground of her sex” was regarded by the High Court as 
requiring a causal link between the sex of the person who is harassed and the 
conduct of the person liable for the harassment.69 The Directive does not require 
such a causal link and merely provides that the conduct must be related to the 
sex of the victim. It was pointed out by the EOC that causation is still relevant 
in regard to direct discrimination, but not in regard to harassment provisions, 
which should only require an association with the sex of a person.
It was argued by the EOC that the implication of the 2005 amendments was 
that, in terms of section 4A(1)(a), an employer could not be held liable for a 
failure to address the harassment of an employee by a third person such as a 
customer or supplier, except if the employee proves that such an omission by 
an employer was because of her sex. This would leave employees who were 
harassed by non-employees in the same (undesirable) position as the victim in 
Pearce.70 The High Court agreed with the EOC that the 2005 amendments did 
not afford sufficient protection and that they should be amended to implement 
the protection as envisaged by the Directive.71
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 2008 
amended section 4A of the SDA. The result is that the employer can now be 
held liable if a third party subjects his employee to harassment in the course 
of the employee’s employment. The SDA provides that the employer must 
take steps that are reasonably practicable to prevent third party harassment. 
The employer must have had knowledge of at least two occasions of 
harassment by a third party (not necessarily the same third party) and will 
only be liable for the third occasion of harassment if he knew about the first 
two occasions.
Employers will not be liable for failing to take action if they did not know 
about the harassment, for single incidents of harassment by non-employees 
and for conduct that is beyond the employer’s control.72 However, employers 
in especially the hospitality sector will now have to make it clear to customers 
and clients that the harassment of employees is unacceptable.73
The waitresses in Burton under the circumstances in that case could now, 
after the amendments, only have claimed from their employer if they had 
been harassed on two other occasions before the Manning incident. Victims 
of sexual harassment by non-employees now have more protection than in the 
era after the Pearce decision, but less protection than afforded by the decision 
in Burton.
69 Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 483 (Admin) 
para 63
70 Walker “Is Bernard Manning Back in Fashion” 2007 (80) Empl LB 3
71 Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 483 
(Admin)
72 Government Equalities Office factsheet referred to in Nicolle “Hands Off!” 2008 NLJ 725
73 725
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4  Australia
4 1  harassment as a form of discrimination
Similar to the position in the United Kingdom, different Acts regulate 
discrimination on different prohibited grounds in Australia. The Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (”the SDA 1984”) and Race Discrimination Act 1975 
(“the RDA”) regulate discrimination on these prohibited grounds.
Section 5(1) of the SDA 1984 states that someone discriminates against a 
person on account of the aggrieved person’s sex if the discriminator treats 
the aggrieved person less favourably than the discriminator treats or would 
treat a person of the opposite sex in circumstances that are the same or are not 
materially different. This is similar to the formulation of race discrimination 
in the RDA.
Sexual harassment is recognized by the Australian courts as discrimination 
based on sex. In Aldridge v Booth74 it was held that
“when a woman is subjected to sexual harassment … she is subjected to that conduct because she is 
a woman, and a male employee would not be so harassed: the discrimination is on the basis of sex. 
The woman employee would not have been subjected to the advance, request or conduct but for the 
fact that she was a woman.”75
The court concluded that the discrimination (in the form of sexual 
harassment) is on the basis of the sex of the victim. This judgment thus eases 
the burden of a victim in a sexual harassment case in that the victim does 
not have to prove that she was treated less favourably than someone of the 
opposite sex. There is thus no need for a comparator in Australian sexual 
harassment law.
4 2  employer liability for harassment of an employee by a co-
employee
In terms of section 106(2) of the SDA 1984 the employer may be held 
liable for the discriminatory acts of his employee. However, the section 
further provides that the employer can avoid liability if he proves that he 
took all reasonable steps to prevent the employee or agent from performing 
discriminatory acts. This is similar to the formulation in the SDA of the United 
Kingdom, which requires the employer to take measures that are “reasonably 
practicable” to prevent discrimination. Although the SDA 1984 itself does not 
require this explicitly, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (HREOC) requires the employer to have a sexual 
harassment policy in order to establish that he took all reasonable measures to 
prevent the employee from engaging in sexual harassment.
74 (1988) 80 ALR 1  
75 16-17
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Paragraph 4.1 of the Code of Practice issued by the HREOC76 provides that 
each employer, regardless of size, must take the following measures to avoid 
liability for sexual harassment:
(i) The employer must take steps to prevent sexual harassment from occur-
ring. An employer should have a sexual harassment policy, implement it 
as fully as possible and monitor its effectiveness; and
(ii) if sexual harassment does occur, the employer must take appropriate 
remedial action in order to remedy sexual harassment and an employer 
should have appropriate procedures for dealing with complaints once 
they are made.
Thus, while the SDA 1984 only requires measures to prevent sexual 
harassment, the Code requires remedial action as well. In line with the 
guidelines of the HREOC, the courts have held that the defence that “reasonable 
steps” have been taken will usually require proof of an effective harassment 
policy.77 Lack of knowledge that the harassment took place will not constitute 
a defence if the employer has not implemented a sexual harassment policy. 
This point is illustrated in Boil v Ishan Ozden78 where the employer was not 
in the country when the harassment took place and there was no indication that 
harassment could take place. The employer was nevertheless held liable for 
the harassment because he had not implemented a sexual harassment policy.
The expectations that employees may have regarding their workplace were 
summarized in Horne v Press Clough Joint Venture.79 In this case two women 
worked as cleaners in a male-dominated workplace. They were continuously 
subjected to pornographic material over a prolonged period. The employer did 
not respond to their complaints. The tribunal stated as follows:
“It is now well-established that one of the conditions of employment is quiet enjoyment of it. That 
concept includes not only freedom from physical intrusion or from being harassed, physically 
molested or approached in an unwelcome manner, but extends to not having work in an unsought 
sexually permeated environment”.80
4 3  employer liability for harassment of its employee by a non-
employee
Section 105 of the SDA 1984 prohibits unlawful sexual discrimination, 
but does not make provision for liability of the employer for the sexual 
harassment of employees by non-employees. However, as the courts have 
accepted that sexual harassment is a form of unlawful sexual discrimination, 
an employer can be regarded as an accessory to sexual harassment in terms 
of section 105.81 Liability of an employer in terms of section 105 differs 
76 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Code of Practice for Employers (2004) http://www hreoc gov au/
sex_discrimination/workplace/code_practice/SH_codeofpractice pdf (accessed 31-01-2009)
77 Dippert v Luxford (1996) EOC 92-828 79, 114
78 (1986) EOC 92-165
79 (1994) EOC 92-556
80 77, 175
81 Australian Human Rights Commission Effectively Preventing and Responding to Sexual Harassment: A 
Code of Practice for Employers (2008)
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from vicarious liability regulated by section 106 of the SDA. For liability in 
terms of section 105 there is no need for a legal tie between the employer 
and the harasser.82 The failure of an employer to protect an employee if the 
employer was aware or should have been aware that sexual harassment was 
taking place, could lead to the employer being personally liable.83 In Elliot v 
Nanda & the Commonwealth84 the court found an employment agency liable 
in terms of section 105 of the SDA for “permitting” acts of sexual harassment. 
The agency placed the complainant as a receptionist with a doctor, while 
the agency was aware of complaints concerning sexual harassment made by 
other receptionists who had previously worked for the same doctor. The court 
stated that if a person knowingly places a victim in a position where “there 
is a real and something more than a remote possibility that the conduct will 
occur”, this will be regarded as permitting the conduct in terms of section 
105.85 In Smith v Sandalwood Motel86 (“Sandalwood Motel”) a motel owner 
employed two singers to perform at his motel. The motel’s patrons sexually 
harassed the singers, but the employer did nothing to address this conduct. The 
tribunal found that the conduct of the employer amounted to less favourable 
treatment. The mere omission by the employer to act was held to constitute 
discrimination on the ground of sex. The employer was held liable on the basis 
of direct discrimination.
This reasoning is similar to that of the court in the Burton case in the 
United Kingdom. However, in terms of the 2008 amendments to the SDA 
in the United Kingdom, the harassed employees in Burton and employees in 
the United Kingdom in general who are in a similar position to the singers in 
the Sandalwood Motel case would have no claim. Employees in the United 
States would, on the other hand, have a claim as the employer knew about 
the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action as 
discussed above.
5  South Africa
5 1  harassment as a form of discrimination
Section 6(1) of the EEA provides that
“No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any employment 
policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex …”
Unlike the United Kingdom and Australia, there are no separate Acts in 
South Africa which regulate discrimination on different prohibited grounds.
Section 6(3) of the EEA provides that harassment of an employee is a form 
of unfair discrimination and is prohibited on any one or a combination of 
grounds of unfair discrimination listed in subsection (1).
82 Para 5 2
83 Para 5 2
84 (2001) 111 FCR 240
85 293
86 (1994) EOC 92-577
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By stating that harassment is unfair discrimination, the legislator eased 
the burden of victims in harassment cases to prove, first, that the harassment 
was discriminatory and secondly, that the harassment amounted to unfair 
discrimination. There is thus no need to prove less favourable treatment or to 
make use of a comparator.
The amended Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment 
Cases in the Workplace87 (“the Code of Good Practice”) states that 
harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the rights 
of an employee.88
5 2  employer liability for harassment of an employee by a co-
employee
5 2 1  Liability in terms of section 60 of the EEA
Section 60 of the EEA is often seen as creating a kind of vicarious liability 
in terms of which the employer can be held liable for discrimination against 
his employee by a co-employee. However, Le Roux and others rightly argue 
that the section in fact creates direct liability for the employer if he fails to 
take certain steps.89 An employer will not be liable in terms of section 60 in 
the following circumstances:
if it did not know about the harassment;• 90
if the harassment was brought to its attention and it had consulted the • 
relevant parties and took steps to eliminate the conduct; or
if it did all that was reasonably practicable to prevent the discriminatory • 
conduct.
Section 60 has been criticized91 for being phrased in such a way that the 
employer will have a double defence against harassment claims, that is, the 
employer can either consult and take steps to eliminate the conduct after the 
event, or it can rely on its sexual harassment policy to prevent the conduct 
as a defence. The effect of this is that the employer has an effective defence 
even when it has done nothing more than have a sexual harassment policy in 
place.
5 2 2  Liability in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA
There is no precedent in South African law of an employer being held 
directly liable for the harassment of its employee by a non-employee. However, 
a South African employer has been held directly liable for the discrimination 
87 GN 1357 in GG 27865 of 2005-08-04
88 Para 4
89 Le Roux, Orleyn & Rycroft Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and Processes (2005) 
94
90 This in contrast to the position in Australia, where an employer who did not know about the harassment 
will only have a defence if he had a sexual harassment policy in place  See Boil v Ishan Ozden (1986) EOC 
92-165
91 See Le Roux “Section 60 of the Employment Equity Act 1998: Will a Comparative Approach Shake This 
Joker Out of the Pack?” 2006 Obiter 411  
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against its employee by a co-employee. In SATAWU for and on behalf of Finca 
v Old Mutual Life Insurance Company (SA) Limited and Burger92 (“Finca”) 
the employer was held directly liable for a racist remark made by one of its 
employees to the supervisor with regard to another employee.
The Labour Court held that Old Mutual was liable for the delay in taking 
action against the person who made the remark and that the employer 
thereby failed to protect the victim. The court held that this amounted to 
direct discrimination in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA.93 The usual test 
for discrimination, namely establishing whether the conduct amounted to 
differentiation on a prohibited ground, was not applied. The court simply 
accepted that in delaying to take appropriate measures after the racist 
remark had been made about an employee by a co-employee, Old Mutual 
itself discriminated against the employee. Old Mutual was not held liable on 
the basis of statutory “vicarious liability” in terms of section 60 (it is not 
entirely clear why), but was held directly liable in terms of section 6. In terms 
of this decision, mere inaction of the employer to act on a complaint about 
discriminatory conduct thus amounted to discrimination by the employer 
itself.
Although the racist remark itself cannot be seen as an “employment policy 
or practice” in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA, Old Mutual’s failure to act can 
be seen as indicative of a policy or practice. It was for this conduct that Old 
Mutual was held directly liable.
5 3  employer liability for harassment of an employee by a non-
employee
Neither the EEA nor the Code of Good Practice addresses the liability 
of an employer for the harassment of its employee by a non-employee.94 
The question is whether the principle of direct liability of the employer for 
discrimination against his employee by co-employees established in Finca 
could be extended to liability for discrimination by non-employees. The court 
in Finca held the employer liable for not having protected the employee against 
racism in the workplace. In principle, there is no reason why an employer 
cannot be held liable if an employee is discriminated against (harassed) by 
a non-employee and the employer does not protect the harassed employee. 
Based on the decision in Finca, this failure to protect could possibly lead to a 
finding of direct discrimination.
Support for holding an employer liable for discrimination in the case of 
harassment of its employee by a non-employee is also to be found in the three 
jurisdictions discussed above.
92 [2006] 8 BLLR 737 (LC)
93 Para 45
94 The Code of Good Practice provides in para 2 1 that “although this code applies to the working 
environment as a guide to employers, employees and applicants for employment, the perpetrators and 
victims of sexual harassment may include: … clients, suppliers, contractors and others having dealings 
with a business ” No further provision addresses the harassment of employees by third persons and the 
Code is clearly meant to deal with harassment by the employer or co-employees  
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In the United States, the liability of the employer for discriminatory conduct 
by non-employee parties is based on negligence. If the employer knew or 
should have known of the harassment and did not take prompt and corrective 
remedial action to protect the employee, the employer will be liable on the 
ground of direct discrimination.
In the United Kingdom, the liability of the employer depends on whether the 
employer took reasonably practicable steps to protect the employee. However, 
the employee must have known of the harassment and the conduct must be 
beyond his control. Furthermore the employer will only be liable for the third 
incident. The victim-employee in Piliso would have found no relief in this 
legal system.
In Australia, employers may be held directly liable for failing to protect 
their employees against harassment by third parties. Inaction will be seen as 
less favourable treatment on the ground of sex.
Piliso could be compared to the United States’ case of Windermere v Little95 
in which the employer’s passive response after harassment by a non-employee 
perpetuated the hostile working environment. The employer in Windermere 
was held liable after only one incident, not for the harassment as such, but 
for discrimination based on an omission to take corrective measures. In the 
United States, as in Australia, the complainant in Piliso would probably have 
been successful on a claim of direct discrimination against the employer.
The basis for employer liability in circumstances similar to those in Piliso 
is the fact that the employer’s failure to address the harassment perpetuated 
the hostile environment created by the conduct of the harasser. It is clear from 
the evidence in both Windermere and Piliso that the trauma of both victim-
employees was exacerbated by the employers not taking their respective 
complaints seriously and not taking measures to eliminate the conduct. The 
fact that their complaints were not addressed had a profound impact on the 
dignity and psychological wellbeing of the harassed employees in Windermere 
and Piliso. Apart from the outcome of measures taken, the very fact that the 
employer regards a complaint as serious and endeavours to resolve the matter 
will go a long way in eradicating the hostile environment created as a result of 
the sexual harassment by non-employees.
5 4  requirements for effectively dealing with harassment of an 
employee by a non-employee
What actions of the employer could have constituted adequate protection for 
the victim and could thus be regarded as an effective defence by an employer 
in a similar position to the employer in Piliso? As discussed above,96 the 
Labour Court held that the legal convictions of the community require an 
employer in the circumstances to
95 No  99-35668 (9th Cir  January 23, 2002)
96 See 1
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start a process of investigation to find the perpetrator;• 97
provide the employee with support in the form of counselling to minimize • 
the psychological trauma and communicate regularly with the employee on 
her needs; and
take all reasonable steps to eliminate or reduce the possibility of the incident • 
recurring.
These requirements set by the court in Piliso overlap to a certain extent 
with measures that section 60 of the EEA requires the employer to take in the 
case of harassment by a co-employee, which requires the employer:
to consult with the relevant parties and to take the necessary steps to • 
eliminate the alleged conduct;98 or
to do everything that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee • 
would not act in contravention of the Act.99
The above requirements could possibly be adapted and combined with 
the court’s requirements in Piliso to provide a defence to an employer for 
direct discrimination in terms of section 6(1) for harassment of its employee 
by a non-employee. Preventative steps that are reasonably practicable (a 
sexual harassment code) may also play a role as a defence, but should not be 
allowed as an alternative defence to consultation and other corrective steps.100 
The court in Piliso added the requirement of counselling and keeping the 
employee-victim up to date with the progress of the investigation to ensure 
the psychological wellbeing of the employee. If these requirements are added 
to consultation and a code (a preventative policy), the employer will have 
a heavier onus than in the case of harassment by a co-employee. This may 
not be justified. On the other hand, these “extra” requirements could also be 
made applicable to harassment by co-employees in an amended Code of Good 
Practice on sexual harassment to ensure more effective protection of victim-
employees.
In the case of harassment by non-employees, the employer will usually 
not have control over the non-employee, who may be a client or customer. 
However, the employer could make it clear that harassment of its employees 
is unacceptable. The Code of good practice should make provision for, and 
provide guidance on, how to manage harassment by third parties. In all three 
jurisdictions discussed above guidance is provided to employers in codes and 
guidelines of the relevant bodies.
6  Conclusion
In Piliso v Old Mutual the employer was held liable for not addressing a 
complaint of its employee for sexual harassment by an unknown person. The 
employer could not be held liable on the basis of vicarious liability, nor in 




100 Le Roux 2006 Obiter 428
424 STELL LR 2009 3
       
terms of section 60 of the EEA, as the complainant could not prove that the 
harasser was an employee. However, the Labour Court held the employer 
liable for infringing the employee-victim’s constitutional right to fair labour 
practices. South African courts have warned against a direct reliance on a 
constitutional right where legislation has been enacted to protect the relevant 
constitutional right. In the light of this critique, the possibility of holding the 
employer directly liable on section 6 of the EEA was investigated.
Legal comparison with foreign jurisdictions, namely the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia, indicated that employers who did not take the 
required measures after a complaint of sexual harassment by a non-employee 
would be held directly liable for discrimination against the victim-employee.
There is no precedent in South African law for holding an employer directly 
liable for discrimination against its employee on the ground of a failure to 
address harassment by a non-employee. However, in the Finca case, the court 
held the employer liable in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA for discrimination 
against its employee where the employer failed to adequately address racial 
harassment of the employee by a co-employee.
In the light of the decision in Finca and the position in the United States, 
United Kingdom and Australia, it is submitted that an employer who does 
not take adequate steps to investigate a complaint of sexual harassment of its 
employee by a non-employee could be held directly liable for discrimination 
against its employee in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA.
SUMMARY
Employees who suffer work-related harassment by non-employees in circumstances in which the 
employer does not protect them can neither institute action against their employer on the basis of 
vicarious liability, nor in terms of section 60 of the Employment Equity Act (EEA). Section 60 of 
the EEA renders the employer liable for certain acts of his employees. In Piliso v Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Co (2007) 28 ILJ 897 (LC) the Labour Court held such a (passive) employer liable on 
the basis of the infringement of the employee-victim’s constitutional right to fair labour practices. 
In the light of criticism against direct reliance on constitutional rights where the right is embodied 
in other legislation, a more appropriate approach would be to hold the employer directly liable for 
discriminating against an employee in an employment practice in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA. An 
examination of foreign jurisdictions (the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia), reveals 
that employers who do not take action to protect victim-employees against work-related harassment 
by non-employees, are held directly liable in terms of anti-discrimination legislation. This article 
proposes that the same approach be adopted in the South African context.
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